The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) sits atop the northeastern portion of Alaska. The Refuge is 19 million acres of untouched wilderness (“Policy Facts”). At issue is whether ANWR ought to be drilled for oil in order to decrease domestic oil prices and economic dependence on foreign oil markets. The debate focuses specifically on the Coastal Plain area in the northern part of the refuge, an area of about 1.5 million acres (Which One Is the real ANWR?). Studies by the United States Geological Survey indicate a large deposit of crude oil, probably 10 billion barrels, exists below the Coastal Plain (USGS). The area is also home to diverse wildlife.

There are two major reasons why proponents favor opening ANWR. First, they argue that the reserves in ANWR are significant enough to affect the price of oil by the barrel and also at the pump. Second, they argue that ANWR reserves will, as oil industry spokesman Kenneth Boyd testified before Congress, “…help offset our current 57% import rate.” Proponents also argue that environmental impact on drilling will be negligible (Testimony of Kenneth Boyd).

Opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge will not accomplish any of these goals. I will show in this paper that opening ANWR to drilling cannot have any significant effect on our economy. Next I will examine why opening ANWR isn’t a solution to a potential energy and economic crisis faced by the United States. I will then explain a more efficacious alternative measure and why Congress ignores it. I will also show why opening ANWR, rather than working toward more effective energy solutions, will perpetuate insecure foreign policy. Finally, we will examine the environmental impact of drilling.

The amount of oil in ANWR is a disputed and vague figure. Congress has only commissioned two surveys, one in 1984-5 and another in 1998. The first survey used two-dimensional (2D) seismic testing. This survey estimated ANWR contained between five and thirty billion barrels of recoverable oil (Murphey). Two-dimensional testing is much like an x-ray; depth is difficult to ascertain. Technology improved and three-dimensional (3D) testing, much like a CAT SCAN, was used in 1998 by the U.S. Geological Survey. This testing narrowed the reserve down to between 6 and 16 billion barrels of recoverable oil, with the mean at 10 billion (USGS). Even so, the extraordinarily high concentration of rocks and other debris make an accurate estimation nearly impossible. Even Boyd conceded before Congress that 3D seismic tests, “…cannot predict whether oil is actually present in the rocks. It can only show the distribution of rocks in the subsurface. Only drilling can find oil.” Boyd also noted that the amount of recoverable oil was around 37% in ANWR due to the high concentration of rocks and debris mixed in the reserve compared to 60% at nearby Prudhoe Bay (Kenneth Boyd Testimony).

Opening ANWR, even if the most liberal estimates of the size of the reserve are used, will have virtually no impact on the price of oil and gas in the United States.

The most recent information released by the Energy Department concludes that ANWR production will max out at 876,000 barrels of oil a day in 2025. If ANWR is opened, it is estimated that 64% of oil consumed in the United States in 2025 will come from foreign sources, as opposed to 70% without ANWR oil (“Alaska oil”). Today the U.S. imports 56% of oil consumed. Opening ANWR does little to offset the growing deficit between domestic oil produced and domestic oil consumed. In 1985 9 million barrels of oil per day were produced domestically (Which one is the real ANWR?). Today, domestic oil production has declined to 5.7 million barrels of oil per day. By 2025 it is estimated that production, without ANWR, will have dwindled to 4.6 million barrels of oil per day (Hebert). The estimated 876,000 barrels of oil per day in 2025 in ANWR fails to cover the projected domestic oil deficit, let alone offset foreign dependence.

If ANWR were open today and at its peak, it would account for only 5% of oil consumption in the United States (Cooper, “Oil Diplomacy”). Those percentages will likely decrease as U.S. consumption escalates (along with dependence on foreign oil markets) fueled by low efficiency trucks and SUV’s along with a growing number of aggregate consumers. 40% of oil produced in the world and consumed in the United States comes from countries in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Cooper, “Oil Diplomacy”). OPEC acts as an 800-pound gorilla dictating the global price of oil (Pelligrini). If ANWR is opened, it is estimated that oil prices will be affected by only thirty to fifty cents per barrel, and just a few cents at the pump (Coupos).

The limited reserves in ANWR coupled with the enormous dependence of the U.S. economy on foreign, and particularly OPEC, oil leaves ANWR reserves insufficient to compensate for a spike in the price of foreign oil.

Drilling in ANWR doesn’t solve energy problems the United States currently faces. If legislation were passed today, it would be at least ten years before the preliminary tests, work and infrastructure construction allowed for production (“Alaska oil”). Despite this fact, President Bush suggested that opening ANWR could have solved the California blackouts of 2001 (McCarthy). Not only does the timeline make this claim ridiculous, but also that only 1% of California’s electricity is produced by oil (Zagorin).

After the energy crises of the 1970’s sweeping reforms were enacted to decrease consumption of oil, particularly dependence on foreign oil. Congress enacted the Energy Policy & Conservation Act of 1975 that mandated automakers average 27.5 gallons per mile in the fleets produced by 1985. The legislation worked. The mandated fuel efficiency was achieved in 1985. Between 1976 and 1992 consumption in the United States remained steady rising to only 7.2 million barrels a day in 1992 compared with 7 million in 1976. Since this time, Congress has not called for any new standards in fuel efficiency, despite progress in technology. Congress has actually lowered standards of fuel efficiency and created tax incentives to purchase SUV’s. This has resulted in aggregate fuel efficiency dropping to an average of 22.1 miles per gallon. Tougher fuel efficiency standards, along with tax incentives for efficient vehicles, would have a greater more immediate impact upon consumption, energy security and the economy in the United States than opening ANWR to drilling (Barlett).

The 1975 legislation also placed a moratorium on building new oil fueled power plants. In the late 80’s the Reagan administration repealed the ban. Since that time, 88% of new plants use oil to create electricity, adding to the deficit of domestic oil production and consumption (Barlett).

This begs the question of why the U.S. government isn’t moving toward policies of fuel efficiency and away from drilling in ANWR. President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have strong financial, political and personal ties to the oil industry. ANWR is a key component of the President’s energy policy, although it was viewed as a lightning rod to the Energy Bill and was separated from it. Vice President Cheney created the Bush administration’s energy policy behind closed doors. Records of these meetings have not been made available to the public (Cooper, “Bush and the Environment”).

Congress also has incentive to align itself with the oil industry. In the 2000 election cycle, members in support of ANWR drilling received an average of almost $3,000 in campaign contributions from the oil industry. Those members who went on the public record in support of drilling received an average of $4,396. Members who opposed drilling averaged donations of just $500 (Thomsen).

The text of the Arctic Coastal Plain Domestic Energy Act reads that drilling in ANWR, “will result in no significant adverse effect on fish and wildlife”. This standard is idealistic, unfortunately it creates a realistic contradiction with exploratory and extraction processes used to obtain oil.

Located near ANWR are developed oil fields on the North Slope in the Prudhoe Bay area. The history of this area serves as an excellent example of oil industry practices and the externalities the surrounding environment bears. Between 1996 and 1999 there were approximately 1600 oil spills in the area (“The Impact of Oil”).

Seismic testing has disastrous consequences on tundra. These large trucks reverberate seismic shock into the ground in order to obtain data. The delicate tundra is shattered as a result. The damage is permanent. Congress has commissioned only two surveys in the past two decades because of the nature of these tests. Damage done by the first tests in 1984-5 is still fresh. Tundra does not recover once broken. These tests would be performed on countless potential sites, as the oil companies search for places to drill (McCarthy).

High quantities of gravel are also required for oil drilling operations. Gravel is extracted from the beds of streams and rivers, destroying critical habitat for musk oxen and caribou (“The Impact of Oil”).

Focusing attention on ANWR instead of real solutions to decrease dependence on foreign oil perpetuates and deepens U.S. dependence. The United States has created allies with otherwise unlikely countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan. These two countries are responsible for egregious violations of human and civil rights. Saudi Arabia is a known violator of women’s rights. Not only does the United States look the other way as these violations occur, foreign aid is actually supplied as well to appease the governments (Cooper, “Oil Diplomacy”).

American policy upholding civil rights contradicts the way the government overlooks the human and civil rights violations of Saudi Arabia, as well as Saudi connections to terrorism. The Saudis are also playing a contradictory balancing act between American money and appeasing anti-American sentiments of many neighbors. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Saudi government initially refused to cooperate in freezing and seizing the funds of known terrorists. Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudis. The Saudi government allows for anti-American propaganda in schools and prior to September 11, looked the other way when terrorists based themselves in the country (Cooper, “Oil Diplomacy”).

By drilling in ANWR rather than investing in alternative methods of energy and conservation U.S. dependence on Saudi Arabia increases thus weakening and compromising foreign policy interests.

The United States must find a solution to the growing consumption of oil and decreasing domestic production. However, as has been shown, drilling in ANWR is not the answer. ANWR oil reserves are incapable of significantly impacting the economy, and they cannot offset foreign dependence. Finally, ANWR drilling will adversely affect the environment.